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Abstract 
We examine the economic efficiency of incentive mechanisms used to promote renewable energy as a 
policy in the European Union (EU). We evaluate the financial performance of renewable investments 
and employ real option theory to model and analyze their impact in the EU’s liberalized electricity 
markets. Our analysis covers key European countries and uses five years of the most recent historic 
electricity price data from 2009 to consider sensitivities in key parameters. As renewable energy policies 
are presented as public goods to address environmental concerns, we explain how the financial 
performance of these policies can strike a balance between social costs and private benefits. We consider 
how markets may incorporate renewable energy without major adjustments. For other regions, our 
research offers lessons on effectiveness and cost-efficiency in designing renewables incentive schemes.  
Keywords: Feed-in tariffs, Feed-in premiums, Real-Option Theory, Investor Returns 
1     INTRODUCTION 
In many regions of the world, reducing 
fossil fuel use by means of support for wind 
turbines, solar cells and other technologies is 
one of the main objectives of energy policy, 
alongside security of supply, reliability of 
delivery and affordability. Meanwhile, concerns 
have been raised about the affordability of 
renewables from the standpoint of consumers, 
business and industry. If such policy objectives 
cannot be achieved without incentives and 
government support, at the heart of the resulting 
renewable electricity generation debate must be 
the question of support mechanisms and, 
including design alternatives, their scope and 
coverage. 
 Using standard financial and economic 
theory, we evaluate the widely used renewable 
support mechanisms which have been adopted 
by the largest economies of the European Union, 
excluding the United Kingdom, and assess their 
economic efficiency as measured by the returns 
to investors in renewable and social costs, 
including externalities. We use the market value 
of incentives paid to investors to analyze the 
financial performance of renewables under the 
various support mechanisms in a number of EU 
countries and observe whether or not the returns 
provided were commensurate with the risks. 
Further, to examine the social optimality of such 
investments, we employ option theory to 
measure the indirect costs of renewables, 
comparing them with the private benefits earned 
by investors. We use representative plants, 
costs, localized operating characteristics -- such 
as solar irradiance -- and historic country level 
electricity price data from 2009 to 2013. We also 
consider how changes to key parameters may 
impact the value of support for renewables. The 
fact that Germany, Italy and Spain have recently 
revised their support schemes lends weight to 
the growing perception that many schemes 
could perhaps have been calibrated differently in 
order to achieve greater economic efficiency [1, 
2, 3]. 
This paper is organized as follows: in 
section 2 we provide perspectives on renewables 
support mechanisms and then consider the 
efficiency of these, as covered in the public 
finance and environmental economics literature. 
Section 3 explains how we use financial option 
theory to model the exposure created by the 
dispatch priority currently afforded to renewable 
generation to address the issues raised in the 
literature review on the economic efficiency of 
renewables incentive mechanisms, social costs 
included. In section 4 we present measurements 
of the financial performance of renewable 
generation, both in terms of private benefits and 
social costs, in order to observe the calibration 
Proceedings of SBE16 Dubai, 17-19 January 2016, Dubai-UAE 
 
of incentive support mechanisms in liberalized, 
traded markets for electricity. The concluding 
section relates our findings to some of the 
critiques of the EU energy and environmental 
policies. 
2      RENEWABLES AS PUBLIC GOODS 
According to public finance theory, the 
nature and size of public goods must be decided 
through collective or social decision-making 
rather than through market processes [4]. 
Renewable energy is supported as a public good 
in mitigating the externalities associated with 
fossil fuels such as greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG), especially when effective taxation of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) has proved difficult. To 
maximize social benefits and reduce social 
costs, various incentive mechanisms have been 
put forward to encourage renewables 
investment, particularly in wind turbine or 
photovoltaic electricity generation. But how 
should the social benefits of renewables in 
reducing GHG be quantified and used to 
determine by how much support this form of 
energy requires? Formally, the definition of how 
much of a public good is justified is based on 
finding the level of production which maximizes 
the difference between marginal social benefits 
and marginal social costs [5]. Given the global 
nature of GHG and atmospheric warming, it is 
difficult to decide how much renewable energy 
is required. But with governments having set 
targets for renewable investment and de-
carbonization, such as the latest 2015 UN 
targets, we can investigate how large incentives 
need to be to achieve such objectives and ensure 
allocative efficiency, i.e. aligning private 
benefits with social costs. The literature on these 
issues exposes several research frameworks and 
opinions. 
2.1 Supporting Renewables: A 
Literature Review  
The premise of policymaking in the 
design of effective support mechanisms for 
renewables is that, although the short-run 
marginal cost of such generation is negligible, 
the fixed costs are very high compared with 
fossil fuel electricity generation and, thus, it is 
assumed that renewables would likely not be 
developed without incentives. The alternative of 
putting a price on CO2 and changing the merit 
order of dispatchable electricity generation has 
been attempted but, arguably, for many reasons 
it has been unsuccessful [6]. In designing 
incentives for the liberalized markets of Europe 
and North America there are special challenges 
as markets are relied upon to deliver renewable 
generation on grounds of public good, but the 
consensus varies on what works best [7].  
In traded electricity markets, support 
mechanisms usually involve removing or 
modifying the various risks faced by renewable 
investors through combinations of guaranteed 
prices above a floating price, a fixed premium or 
uplift to a floating electricity price, and a transfer 
of risks to other parties or the greater system [8]. 
Indirect support may also be derived through the 
possibility of revenue from trading renewables 
certificates [9]. What works best in delivering 
renewables investment continues to be debated, 
although according to US Department of Energy 
National Renewables Laboratory [10], tariffs are 
more compatible with deregulated generation 
markets. In summary, there has been varied 
research into the effectiveness of policies in 
promoting renewable targets but no consensus 
has emerged. Given the levels of renewable 
investment now achieved in Europe, North 
America and elsewhere, the focus of debate has 
shifted to the costs and efficiency of delivery 
mechanisms, as explained below.   
 
2.2 Allocative Efficiency and Renewables  
The premise that deregulated and 
privatized electricity markets require sufficient 
incentives to attract investors begs the issue of 
how to ensure economic efficiency in delivering 
policy goals. To do this, various approaches 
have been used to calibrate the previously 
mentioned schemes, including calibrating 
incentives (i) using the levelized cost of 
renewables (LCOE); (ii) according to the 
avoided utility generation cost; (iii) based on the 
value of renewables to society; (iv) using 
renewable project costs plus a reasonable return; 
and (v) using an auction to calibrate the right to 
supply renewables to promote price discovery 
and avoid economic rent [11]. 
Calibrated in different manners and 
often revised, the sheer variety of such methods 
suggests a lack of consensus on how to deliver 
supply while avoiding economic rents and how 
to align social costs with private benefits and 
ensure economic efficiency. For example, a 
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study of wind parks in Portugal found that 
owners of such renewables were over 
compensated under the feed-in tariff scheme. 
The Portuguese authorities used a LCOE model 
to determine the necessary and appropriate level 
of support. The researcher showed that under 
Portugal’s 2005 legislation $4.1 billion was 
spent on feed-in tariff support and, in addition, 
its 2013 legislation required another $840 
million of public spending on wind energy 
support [12]. In Ontario, Canada, a debate over 
whether a support scheme for wind and solar 
renewables would be cost or revenue-based was 
resolved by adopting the German approach of 
benchmarking incentives for local wind and 
solar renewables [13]. In numerous countries a 
surge in renewable investment has been 
followed by reductions in incentives, suggesting 
a divergence between how policymakers value 
subsidies such as feed-in tariffs or premiums and 
how the markets and investors may see them 
[14, 15]. 
To calibrate a support mechanism to 
ensure its economic efficiency, it is necessary to 
compare the direct cost of the incentive price 
against the market price as well as any indirect 
costs, given the nature of renewables and the 
market setting. The intermittency of renewable 
energy and the lack of dispatchability must be 
considered in the valuation of renewables: 
because electricity is not storable, its price will 
vary depending on when it is produced. In 
deregulated, liberalized markets, electricity is 
usually priced hourly or half-hourly. The 
common method of comparing renewables with 
fossil fuel generation uses LCOE and treats 
electricity as a homogenous good and power 
supply from different fuels and technologies as 
commoditized perfect substitutes. This is 
problematic, however, because it ignores 
temporal and spatial issues and their consequent 
system impact [16, 17].  
To tackle the system costs created by 
renewable energy, the US Department of Energy 
recently proposed a new metric: Levelized 
Avoided Cost of Energy (LACE) to measure the 
economic merits of renewables. This includes 
the cost to the grid or system of generating the 
electricity that is otherwise displaced by a new 
generation project. This is currently being 
evaluated, but has not yet gained acceptance 
[18]. However, using LACE requires system 
level knowledge and may involve arbitrary 
decisions as to what represents the marginal 
plant.  Altogether there is little consensus on the 
best way to calibrate renewable energy 
incentives in liberalized markets so as to 
determine appropriate compensation and, 
ultimately, promote economic efficiency. To 
address the issues around valuation of 
incentives, we suggest a new way of looking at 
renewable energy to analyze the appropriate 
level of returns, given the risks and impacts. 
This is based on how its costs may be hedged, 
which affords an understanding of the financial 
performance of renewables in liberalized market 
settings and of how incentives might be 
calibrated to reward renewables investments 
efficiently. 
 
3. METHODS, MODEL AND DATA 
To propose appropriate calibration for 
renewables incentives, it is necessary is to know 
the value derived from operating renewables in 
integrated, liberalized traded electricity markets, 
such as those in the EU. A number of questions 
arise. First, from the empirical perspective of a 
renewable energy investor, what returns were 
earned under the various incentive schemes 
offered in the EU? Second, from the perspective 
of economic efficiency, taking into account the 
full impact of renewables in liberalized markets, 
has the return provided to investors been 
generous? Third, do such returns to investors 
include all direct and indirect costs from the 
operation of renewable generation? And, last, as 
the priority dispatch of renewable electricity into 
an integrated liberalized system may make 
markets more volatile and reduce prices, how 
could the full impact of this, in terms of system 
cost, exposure and economic efficiency, be 
assessed?  
 
3.1 Renewables in Liberalized Markets 
Setting the right incentives for 
renewables in liberalized, traded electricity 
markets presents many challenges. In the 1990s 
most programs to deregulate and liberalize 
electricity markets gave a prominent role to 
trading. Through the interaction of supply and 
demand, markets were balanced and reliability 
ensured, with the marginal price set by the most 
efficient generators, the combined-cycle gas 
turbine plants. In such markets, fossil fuel 
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generators compete on short-run marginal costs 
in order to sell to a centralized grid that owns the 
high-voltage transmission systems and 
substations. In liberalized electricity markets, 
wholesale prices for electricity are made half-
hourly, reflecting the requirements of the largest 
users, which are metered 48 times per day. By 
means of system planning and the right mix of 
flexible and less flexible plants, grid operators 
may use short-term balancing, allied to trading 
markets, to cover demand prediction errors or 
unplanned outages, while entering into longer 
term contracts to avoid supply disruptions and 
ensure adequate reserve margins. 
Introducing renewable energy into this 
market presents challenges as it cannot be 
dispatched on demand but generates when the 
wind blows or the sun shines. For this reason, 
renewables are given ‘dispatch priority’. When 
they are generating, other plants with flexible 
and controllable output must reduce their output. 
Dispatch priority creates short-term balancing 
costs for the grid and incumbents, plus long-
term costs such as the need for grid connections 
and investment in more dispatchable generation 
as back-up. The average thermal efficiency of 
incumbent plants may be reduced and the 
frequency of unexpected outages and 
breakdowns may increase. Such externalities 
need to be included when assessing the value of 
renewables. Setting incentive mechanisms for 
renewables -- such as feed-in tariffs or feed-in 
premiums -- while excluding the benefits of not 
paying for the common resource of dispatchable 
back-up generation and grid management means 
the true returns and benefits to renewables are 
under estimated and resources are wasted. 
 
3.2 The Value of Renewable Energy 
To properly value renewable energy, the 
private return to investors needs to be compared 
with the total costs of renewables schemes, 
including not just incentive prices but any 
indirect costs of created exposures. To do this in 
a liberalized market setting, we employ option 
theory as it has been applied to model and 
optimize flexible, dispatchable plants [19, 20, 
and 21]. The renewables purchase obligation 
that covers grid operators, supply companies 
and consumers across the EU means that, 
whenever renewables are generating, other 
output must be reduced and all other 
dispatchable plant must be re-prioritized or even 
shut down. Typically, a renewable operator will 
enter into a long-term supply contract with a 
renewable aggregator or integrated utility. This 
is similar to a contract for differences (CfD) 
between the market price and the price paid 
through the feed-in tariff or premium. The 
difference between the value stream to the 
renewable operator from a feed-in tariff or a 
feed-in premium and the normal wholesale price 
of electricity faced by the renewable energy 
purchaser creates an exposure for the buyer and 
ultimately for society. Under most schemes, if 
hourly prices exceed the tariff the renewable 
operator must return the excess [22]. Through 
applying option theory we can quantify the value 
of this exposure. 
In agreeing to take renewable electricity 
under a contract by which the buyer is liable for 
the difference between the market and incentive 
price -- effectively a CfD -- an exposure is 
created and ultimately imposed upon the greater 
system. This exposure theoretically could be 
hedged by buying a strip of put options – giving 
the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to sell 
-- with strike prices equal to the feed-in tariff 
price. The theoretical price of the option 
represents the cost of accepting such risk for the 
purchaser, which is ultimately borne by the 
system. If market prices fall, the exposure 
arising from such a contract increases, but 
through using put options conferring the right to 
sell at the incentive price, a purchaser of 
renewable energy could theoretically hedge the 
exposure. The price of the put option represents 
the cost of having to take renewable power 
under the purchase obligation, a cost that is 
ultimately borne by society’s stakeholders, as it 
is equal and opposite in value to neutralize the 
exposure.   
To price the exposure created by the 
difference between the market price and that of 
renewable energy – created through, for 
example, a feed-in tariff -- we use put options 
with strike prices set at the price paid for such 
energy, because this method could neutralize 
and off-set the cost of purchasing electricity 
above the market price. In summary, the 
combination of dispatch priority and incentive 
pricing enjoyed by renewable operators creates 
an exposure for the buyer and, ultimately, for the 
system or grid which may be priced and 
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theoretically hedged using put options. Other 
approaches have been considered to quantify the 
exposure to renewable energy, such as 
comparing it with the LCOE, but, as explained, 
this excludes any indirect costs for the 
renewables. One researcher has tried a statistical 
approach to value the CfD contract against 
futures markets, but lack of liquidity and risk 
aversion may render such results tentative [23].   
 
3.3 Data 
For the years 2009 through 2013 data 
were collected for the following: (i) support 
levels for renewables for the major countries of 
the EU; (ii) wholesale prices for electricity 
across within these countries; (iii) price 
volatility in the same countries; (iv) daily sun 
irradiation, by countries; (v) average capacity 
factors for wind turbines and photovoltaic 
facilities and (vi) costs per installed MW of 
renewable investments. Data from the Council 
of European Energy Regulators (CEER) was 
used for support levels by country and 
technology, per MWh as summarized in Table 1 
below.  
Table 1. Renewables incentives  
 
For comparing what was paid for 
renewable energy as against the wholesale 
market price of electricity, day-ahead marker 
pricing data for the specified EU countries was 
taken from Bloomberg. Several sources were 
checked for solar irradiation [24]. Data from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US 
Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Agency (U.S. DOE) were consulted for capacity 
factors of both wind and photovoltaic electricity 
generation [25 and 26]. Both official -- EIA and 
IEA -- and commercial sources were examined 
for the price per installed unit of wind and solar 
capacity, with the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 
for 2014 proving the most useful [27]. To adjust 
the time value of the cash flows arising from 
renewable generation, a weighted average cost 
of capital of 10 percent was assumed as this 
reflects the average opportunity cost of capital 
among Europe’s major integrated energy 
utilities, while the return on investment 
averaged at 8 percent. Given the nature of the 
cash flow arising from renewable electricity 
generation, we have also discussed (below) 
whether a different rate is applicable. To 
calibrate the option pricing model, day-ahead 
price volatilities were taken from Bloomberg. 
Since historic wholesale electricity price data at 
half-hourly frequency is not readily available, a 
scalar adjustment was made to the option model 
calculations, based upon differences in value 
between day-ahead and half-hourly options to 
estimate the exposure which buyers of 
renewable energy faced. Option strike prices 
were set at the various incentive prices, as in 
Table 1. Incentive prices minus the historic 
market prices together determine by how much 
intrinsic value the option has. DerivaGem, 
Version 3.00 was used.   
  
4 MODEL SET-UP AND RESULTS 
We examined the returns earned by 
renewables investors using a return on capital 
employed measure, specifically:   
 
ROCE (percent) = 
Earnings before interest and tax
Capital employed
 (1) 
 
Capital employed is the capital required 
to purchase renewable generation capacity and 
excludes funding liabilities. As operating costs 
of renewable plant are low for wind turbines, 
especially during the first ten years of operation, 
and even lower for photovoltaic -- estimated at 
just 1 percent -- such costs were excluded from 
earnings. Return on capital employed (ROCE) 
shows the value of a business and whether it can 
create value exceeding its weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC). To validate the ROCE 
results, we also extended the 2009 to 2013 
results by 20 years to 2029, and computed an 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) comparing the 
initial investment against the historic and 
projected revenues. The IRR results resemble 
the ROCE results. 
 To analyze the value in renewables, we 
compute a ROCE using the total amount 
received for generated output by an 
owner/operator. Sellers of renewables receive a 
combination of the wholesale market price for 
2009 - 2013 SOLAR PV
SOLAR 
OTHER
WIND 
OFFSHORE
WIND 
ONSHORE
Minimum 220.53€     68.04€      41.05€           41.05€          
Maximum 496.03€     290.90€    135.50€         224.80€        
Average 381.34€     177.34€    102.23€         92.60€          
RE Incentives for 
Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, and 
Spain (Euros MWh)
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electricity, plus the incentive premium paid by 
the buyer, while buyers of this energy are 
exposed at half-hourly granularity to the 
difference between the incentive price and the 
wholesale market price of electricity. We have 
averaged the result over the five years of 
available data and then compared it to capital 
employed. Summary results appear in table 2. 
 
Table 2. ROCE  
 
 
Our calculations show that returns to 
renewables owners and operators varied 
between generous and very generous. Solar 
photovoltaic technology earned the highest 
return on capital employed followed by onshore 
wind energy. The average ROCE for solar 
photovoltaic exceeds 30 percent, while for 
onshore wind generation the ROCE was also 
very high. In Italy, for example, the returns for 
solar and wind were spectacular. Across the EU, 
only Spain made noteworthy investment in solar 
thermal technology and the ROCE earned by 
investors exceeded 30 percent. Compared with 
the rate of 10 percent so as to discount the time 
value of future earnings, ROCE results exceeded 
the assumed cost of capital. Given the 
guaranteed off-take, the dispatch priority 
afforded to renewables investors, the credit 
quality of counterparties taking the generated 
electricity and the government backing to 
incentive prices, the generosity of the terms 
provided to investors is surprising. As the 
relationship between incentive prices and ROCE 
is linear, reducing incentives by half would still 
have generated returns equal to, or exceeding, 
the WACC in all countries analyzed. In 
summary, although the various programs across 
the EU were effective in getting renewables 
plant built, the cost of the incentives was 
economically inefficient, offering supra normal 
returns for essentially risk free investments.  
 We also assessed the exposure created 
by the operation of renewable power that is 
faced by its grid operators, integrated utilities 
and ultimately consumers and taxpayers. Buyers 
of renewables, aggregators and integrated 
utilities under dispatch priority face the 
exposure arising from having to purchase 
electricity at the difference between the 
renewables incentive price and the traded 
wholesale price of electricity. To hedge such an 
exposure, buyers of renewables could purchase 
a strip of half-hourly put options to neutralize 
the potential downside of having to purchase 
electricity above the wholesale traded market 
price. Even if such options were not tradable, the 
price of the option would represent the cost 
involved in accepting the risk. At day-ahead 
frequency, using the scalar adjustment noted in 
section 3.3 for five years, the prices of put 
options were computed using the standard put 
option model and parameters [28].   
 To appreciate the profitability of 
renewables shown above, we quantify the 
externality of operating renewable power, per 
MWh of capacity, and compare it to what was 
earned per MWh of installed capacity. As shown 
in Table 3 below, it would cost the renewable 
energy buyers on average nearly twice as much 
to hedge the exposure arising from the 
difference between the feed-in incentive prices 
as what the renewables owner/operator received. 
For example, while the renewable operator with 
solar PV earned €342,100 per MW of capacity, 
it cost buyers of such energy €669,598 to hedge 
the exposure. For onshore wind the cost of the 
externality is the difference between €228,082 
and €441,827.  
 
Table 3. Revenues versus Hedging Costs 
 
 COUNTRY  SOLAR PV 
 SOLAR 
THERMAL 
 WIND OFF-
SHORE 
 WIND ON-
SHORE 
BELGIUM
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 256,891€              236,124€              229,284€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 558,305€              494,240€              431,982€              
FRANCE
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 363,390€              311,525€              174,308€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 788,972€              632,533€              348,868€              
GERMANY
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 250,184€              217,322€              99,099€                
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 532,015€              451,584€              232,130€              
ITALY
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 503,184€              476,839€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 858,351€              946,254€              
SPAIN
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 483,132€              359,723€              223,374€              223,374€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 839,326€              617,290€              444,620€              375,802€              
THE NETHERLANDS 
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 195,819€              42,147€                223,345€              165,587€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 440,620€              86,489€                446,541€              315,923€              
AVERAGE
RE Owner/Operator Revenue 342,100€              200,935€              242,338€              228,082€              
Cost to Buyer to Hedge Exposure 669,598€              351,889€              493,904€              441,827€              
AVERAGE DIFFERENCE 70% 63% 71% 67%
AVERAGE ANNUAL REVENUE OVER FIVE YEAR PER MW OF CAPACITY 
VERSUS COST OF HEDGING THE CONSEQUENT EXPOSURE
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As shown in Table 3, the costs of 
hedging renewables exposure exceeds the gains 
from renewables operation. The result is 
intuitive: intermittency must be hedged for 
every half of the year while renewable operation 
is for only a small proportion, driven by the 
vagaries of the weather. The costs of hedging 
solar PV generation are greater in the southern 
countries of Europe than those in the north due 
to the many more operational hours over which 
exposure is created. Although buyers of 
renewables are only exposed to purchasing 
energy from solar facilities during daylight 
hours, the higher incentives provided for the 
former make the cost of hedging its exposure 
generally greater. Since renewable energy 
owners and operators do not bear the 
externalities in hedging costs imposed upon the 
greater market, and ultimately on consumers, 
their financial returns are enhanced.  If roughly 
one-half of that part of the costs imposed upon 
dispatchable generators and, ultimately on 
consumers and taxpayers, in hedging 
renewables exposure were shifted back to its 
owner/operators, the returns for them would be 
eliminated. Given the attractive returns provided 
to renewables owner/operators and the 
externalities imposed upon buyers of their 
output, there would seem to be a strong 
empirical case for re-designing electricity 
markets to manage externalities and reduce the 
returns provided.   
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
We made two sets of observations based 
upon empirical research and analysis. The first 
concerns the financial performance from 
operating or owning a renewable energy facility, 
while the second draws attention to the 
significant externalities arising from 
renewables. We calculated the financial 
performance of various renewable technologies 
across the key EU countries using a ROCE 
approach. We have found that the ROCE results, 
as incentivized for the range of renewable 
technologies under the various EU schemes, 
were high. At a time when Europe’s major 
energy utilities were earning less than their cost 
of capital, investors in renewables earned 
generous returns while bearing little if any risk. 
Using option theory to quantify the exposure 
created for buyers of renewables we have found 
that the costs amounted to nearly double what 
was earned from the operation of wind and solar 
facilities. Incorporating the costs to utilities and 
ultimately society of hedging against the risk 
profile of renewables, rather than the already 
expensive incentive costs as measured in returns 
to renewable investors, the full costs would be 
greater.   
It has been suggested that the operation 
of renewables may lower market prices and 
contribute to price volatility, because prices and 
volumes are generally correlated [29]. In 
addition, renewable energy may create system 
wide costs as more thermal plants are paid to be 
on standby or minimum stable generation, lest 
the wind stops blowing or clouds appear. From 
option theory we see that if the electricity market 
were to become more volatile, this would make 
the cost of hedging such exposure greater. 
Further, with the variable cost of operating 
renewables close to zero, this operation could 
depress electricity prices by increasing the 
spread between the feed-in premium or tariff and 
the market price, which would increase the cost 
of hedging against such an exposure. 
Renewables impose costs upon incumbents, the 
system and ultimately society but, with growing 
output, become more profitable. In conclusion, 
although the EU countries’ support policies have 
been successful in getting renewable energy 
facilities built, the direct costs of incentivizing 
renewables plus the indirect costs to society 
have raised legitimate questions as to their 
economic efficiency. Promoting renewables 
requires a more fundamental consideration of 
market design rather than the addition of specific 
incentives.   
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